School Reform: Innovation and the Rhetoric of Change by Barone, Carlo & Argentin, Gianluca
6School RefoRm
Innovation and the Rhetoric of Change
Gianluca Argentin and Carlo Barone
In July 2015, the so-called Good School reform bill, which introduces 
many noteworthy changes in the Italian school system, was passed. 
After outlining the trajectory of the reform in the first section of this 
chapter, for reasons of space we will limit ourselves to a discussion of 
the main areas of intervention: the governance of the schools (in the 
second and third sections), the special plan for hiring teachers (the 
fourth section), and the strengthening of the humanistic curriculum 
and of the links between the schools and the labor market (the fifth 
section). While awaiting the delegated decrees and the implementing 
regulations, we will provide a provisional assessment of the reform in 
the concluding section. 
The Good School reform follows a meritocratic model of gover-
nance and is characterized by a strong role for school principals. Such 
a model stands in sharp contrast to the political culture of the center-
left, which has led to pronounced conflict within the center-left itself 
as well as between the governing majority and the opposition. How-
ever, when looking at the problems of implementation, the innovative 
scope of the reform would appear to be more modest. This suggests 
that, apart from reforming the schools, an important political issue 
at stake is the ideological positioning of the Partito Democratico (PD, 
Democratic Party) in the central question of the governance of the 
public sector and in its relations with the trade unions.
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The Trajectory of the Reform
On 9 July 2015, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi tweeted: “One hundred 
thousand new jobs, more meritocracy, more autonomy. #labuonascuola 
has become law” (Riccardi 2015). This statement summed up the reform 
that had been approved that same day by the Chamber of Deputies.1 
The trajectory leading up to the parliamentary approval of this reform 
can be divided into three phases. The first phase involved the circula-
tion of a programmatic document in September 2014 that was drafted 
on short notice by a small group of experts at the Ministry of Education, 
Universities, and Research (MIUR) earlier that summer. Renzi launched 
the document by means of a video message in which the minister of 
education, Stefania Giannini, did not appear and was not even men-
tioned. In this video, Renzi addressed himself directly to the citizens 
and to the teachers, presenting key themes with rather empathic slo-
gans (e.g., “I propose to you a pact on education, not the umpteenth 
reform, not the usual discourse that all politicians propose”).2 Published 
online, the document clearly outlined the objectives of the reform and 
its main policy measures, two of which were especially emphasized. 
The first was the special plan for hiring teachers, with the ambitious 
goal of “putting an end once and for all to the long-standing issue of 
precarious jobs in the Italian schools.”3 The second called for the cre-
ation of autonomy teams in each school, that is, groups of teaching staff 
members who would be mainly dedicated to enriching the curriculum. 
The other noteworthy changes were the proposal to strengthen the 
role of school principals in appointing and assessing teachers and the 
suggestion to replace seniority-based wage increases with performance 
bonuses. Although the initial reform project was passed in a largely 
unaltered form, it nevertheless had a rather bumpy ride.
The second phase of this reform process consisted of an online 
consultation of pupils, parents, teachers, and principals on the pro-
grammatic document. This consultation lasted from September to 
November 2014 and, according to the data provided by the govern-
ment on its official site, involved 207,000 participants. This phase 
marked a clear break with the past, not only because of the unprec-
edented decision to rely on a large-scale online consultation of those 
involved in the education system, but also because this process came 
to replace de facto the traditional consultations with the trade unions. 
The government sought support for the reform directly within the edu-
cation system while skipping the intermediation of the trade unions, 
who now found themselves sidestepped and marginalized.
The third phase began with the presentation on 27 March 2015 of a 
draft law, which was followed by a parliamentary procedure of about 
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three months. Overall, opposition to the act from the side of the minor-
ity parties was mild. The Lega Nord (LN, Northern League) raised 
some issues and proposed some amendments concerning marginal 
aspects (the need for better involvement of the local authorities, refer-
ences to an alleged “gender theory”). Forza Italia even made enthusi-
astic comments, such as those of Mariastella Gelmini, ex-minister of 
education: “Words such as merit, career progression of the teachers, 
assessment, bonuses, links between schools and the private sector, 
reform of the collegial bodies, have been put in the spotlight by the 
center-right. Now Renzi takes care of putting them into practice.”4 The 
Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S, Five Star Movement) insisted on a stronger 
involvement of Parliament and criticized the tax breaks for private 
schools as well as the reduction in the number of new appointments, 
which went from 150,000 in the programmatic document of September 
2014 to only 100,000 in the text debated in the Chamber of Deputies 
(Vendemiale 2015).
The most determined opposition was mounted by the trade unions 
and the minority within the PD. On 5 May 2015, a widely adhered to 
school strike was called, followed by the obstruction of the final grading 
session and the boycott of the INVALSI tests.5 On the occasion of the 
strike, Giuseppe Civati, at that point a member of the minority within 
the PD, stated that “the PD has betrayed its electoral commitments and 
has produced a school reform far removed from our political culture,” 
while Stefano Fassina, referring to the new role of the school principals, 
argued that “schools cannot be barracks with commanding officers.”6 
This aspect, together with the introduction of merit-based remuneration 
for the teachers, has been the point of most friction with the PD minor-
ity and the trade unions. These elements represent a clear break with 
the positions previously held by the PD, which favored the uniform 
remuneration of teachers and gave primacy to collegial bodies. The day 
after the strike, Renzi replied to his critics with a new video message in 
which he set out and defended the main points of the reform, pointing 
to the major investment his government was making in the school sys-
tem. The prime minister thus confirmed his personal engagement with 
this reform, while Minister of Education Giannini was only marginally 
visible during the process. In fact, the entire procedure was handled by 
a small staff of experts who answered directly to Renzi and to his policy 
adviser Davide Faraone, undersecretary of education.
The political gamble Renzi’s government was making had been 
clear since the document of September 2014. The new manager-princi-
pal role and merit-based remuneration would be rendered more palat-
able by the special plan for hiring those on precarious contracts (an 
issue traditionally close to the heart of the teachers’ unions) and by the 
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significant increase (124 million euros) in the regular funding for the 
schools. However, between May and June 2015 the act became stalled, 
as it was confronted with strong and broad-based opposition from 
within the education system and from the trade unions.
Renzi’s strategy to ensure the final passage of the bill rested on 
three decisions. The first was to initially make the implementation 
of the special plan for hiring teachers for the 2015–2016 academic 
year conditional upon the approval of the reform in its entirety, thus 
saddling Parliament with the responsibility for any possible delays 
in hiring teachers. The second decision was to collect in a mega-
amendment some points raised by the minority of the PD, such as the 
criteria to be applied in the hiring of teachers and the composition 
of the committee for the assessment of teachers’ performances that 
was to be established in each school. The third decision was to table 
a vote of confidence in the Senate on the mega-amendment. The bill 
was passed, first by the Senate on 25 June 2015 and subsequently by 
the Chamber of Deputies, with 277 votes in favor, 173 against, and 4 
abstentions. The Democratic Party, Area Popolare (AP, Popular Area), 
and Scelta Civica (SC, Civic Choice) voted in favor. Among the minor-
ity of the PD, five opposing votes and 25 absences were counted, 
including those of well-known members such as Pier Luigi Bersani 
and Rosy Bindi. The text, a single article with over 200 paragraphs 
(not characterized by paramount clarity), leaves ample room for fur-
ther specification of the subsequent implementing decrees that are to 
be issued in the 18 months following the approval of the law.
Overall, the passage of the reform confirmed some characteristic 
traits of the political approach of Renzi’s government. In terms of 
methods, the strong media exposure of the prime minister, his inno-
vative use of a large-scale online consultation, the search for a direct 
connection with the electorate, and his hostility toward mediation with 
the trade unions and with the minority of the PD represent a marked 
discontinuity with respect to the traditional modus operandi of the 
center-left, which has always prioritized consultation with the trade 
unions. Moreover, the decision to appeal directly to the voters with a 
video is clearly reminiscent of Silvio Berlusconi’s means of communi-
cating. In terms of content, the reform has marked a break with some 
core principles of the center-left, that is, the primacy of the collegial 
bodies, the uniformity of the remuneration of the teachers, and the 
use of bureaucratic appointment procedures (rankings and competitive 
examinations). Also, this case displays an encompassing vision of the 
governance of public sector employment (see Di Mascio and Natalini, 
this volume), inspired by a meritocratic model that is profoundly for-
eign to the traditional political culture of the center-left.
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The Governance of the Education System:  
School Autonomy and Stronger Principals
Article 1 of the law opens with a clear statement: in order to achieve 
the fundamental objectives of the education system, “the current law 
gives full weight to the autonomy of the educational institutions.” 
The Good School reform explicitly aims to conclude the process initi-
ated by the center-left with the reform of school autonomy in 1997, a 
reform referred to in Article 1. The increased autonomy of the schools 
had served to weaken the traditionally centralist framework of the 
Italian school system by awarding significant room for maneuver to 
the individual institutions in terms of defining their curriculum, deter-
mining their own organizational framework, and managing their rela-
tions with the surrounding area. At the same time, the 1997 reform 
left the central level in control of career advancement according to 
seniority and of the recruitment of teachers by means of rankings and 
nationwide competitive examinations. Also, in terms of their budget, 
the schools were granted only limited room for maneuver. Hence, 
with respect to the two central levels concerning the management 
of human and financial resources, the autonomy of the schools had 
made little progress.
With the Good School reform, Renzi’s government claims to have 
completed this process. As far as financial autonomy is concerned, the 
reform aims to stimulate donations to the schools, providing for a tax 
deduction of 65 percent of the donations made. This is the so-called 
school bonus, which is available to private parties (e.g., the families of 
pupils), companies, and non-profit organizations. It should be noted 
that today’s families already contribute to the budget of the schools 
with a voluntary contribution toward the enrollment of the pupils. 
In order to reduce the risk that parties external to the schools would 
be able to exert influence by making generous donations, a ceiling of 
100,000 euros has been imposed. Nevertheless, a donation of even 
10,000 euros would have a significant impact on the budget of a single 
school, given its financial condition. A second objection concerns the 
varying ability of schools to attract external funding. Schools located 
in well-to-do areas and whose parents come from a wealthier social 
background will be able to count on more abundant donations. This 
might reinforce the existing disparities, with some schools abundantly 
funded and others less endowed with financial resources. In order to 
contain such risks, 10 percent of the total donations will be reallocated 
in favor of schools that have received less funding, a modest redistri-
bution overall. If it is to be successful, this measure should neverthe-
less guarantee more budget autonomy to the schools.
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The reform combines the growing autonomy in the management 
of the schools’ resources with autonomy in defining the curricu-
lum. The first step in this direction is an effort to enhance the plan 
of the educational activities (POF, piano dell’offerta formativa) that 
each school drafts. The POF will now become a three-year plan that 
represents the “fundamental constitutive document of the cultural 
and operational identity of the educational institutions and specifies 
the curricular, extracurricular, educational, and organizational design 
that each school adopts in the framework of its autonomy” (Art. 5). 
Above all, it is the starting point for the assessment of the school 
principal and thus may potentially become more binding than is the 
case today. The plan must enumerate a set of educational objectives 
that can be achieved during the course of the three years, estab-
lish the curricular and extra-curricular activities necessary to achieve 
those objectives, and identify the human and financial resources to 
be employed to that end. This form of medium-term planning with 
specifically earmarked resources is rather new for the Italian schools, 
even though there is a risk that in practice the “new” three-year plans 
will copy the “old” POFs.
The second step is the creation of teams dedicated to giving content 
to the educational autonomy of the schools, that is, groups of teachers 
who are primarily charged with carrying out the three-year plan of 
educational activities. Hence, those teachers may be employed for cur-
ricular activities or substitutions, but also for projects to improve and 
upgrade the services that each school decides to develop (e.g., activi-
ties to reduce the dropout rate or to promote active citizenship). These 
autonomy teams should give rise to a new kind of teacher, less rooted 
in curricular teaching and more anchored to planning and didactic 
innovation. Yet much will depend on the number of staff made avail-
able to the schools. There is a risk that the autonomy teams will be 
diverted from these innovative tasks to be employed in substituting 
for other teachers. It also is possible that problematic teachers will be 
assigned to such horizontal tasks.
The third step toward more school autonomy is the strengthening 
of the prerogatives of the principals. They play a central role in devel-
oping the three-year plans, and above all, as we will see in the next 
section, they acquire substantial room for maneuver in the recruit-
ment and teaching assignment of the teachers—unprecedented ele-
ments in Italy’s educational system.
The fourth step that marks the growing autonomy of the schools, 
while simultaneously strengthening the role of the principal, is the 
establishment of a yearly fund of 200 million euros to enhance the 
performance of the teachers. The earmarked sum is significant as it 
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amounts to an average of more than 250 euros per teacher. Because 
these funds will be awarded to some teachers only, they will create 
a substantial incentive. When distributing these funds, the principal 
should avail him- or herself of a committee for the assessment of the 
teachers. Chaired by the principal, this committee will be composed 
of three of the school’s teachers and two representatives of the par-
ents (for kindergartens and elementary schools), or a representative 
of the pupils and a representative of the parents (for the secondary 
level of education). In addition, a member external to the school will 
have a seat on the committee. The regional education authorities will 
select that member from among the teachers and the principals of 
other schools. The committee shall specify the criteria to be employed 
for an evaluation of the teachers’ performance on the basis of the 
quality of their teaching, their contribution to the improvement of the 
school, and the responsibilities they have assumed in the manage-
ment of the school. 
In reality, it is unlikely that the principal will choose to differentiate 
the remuneration of teachers on the basis of assessments of the qual-
ity of their teaching, as this would inevitably give rise to polemics and 
conflicts in the school, not least because any objective basis for com-
parison is missing. Instead, these funds most likely will be channeled 
toward those teachers who are primarily engaged in the governance of 
the school. Moreover, the reform establishes that principals may select 
from among the autonomy team up to 10 percent of teachers who will 
assist them in organizational and didactic support activities. As Renzi 
would say, each principal “picks his own team,” and, we might add, 
each principal is now equipped with a significant economic lever to do 
so. Although it would appear to be essential, this aspect was largely 
passed over in the debates on the “super-principal.” Whether the 
principal will be able to play a leadership role rests as much on his 
or her own faculties as on the ability to assemble a supporting group 
of teachers whose voices carry weight among their colleagues. This 
group must be willing to assume decision-making responsibilities and, 
if required, to ensure the appropriate mediation between the principal 
and the teaching staff. The reform offers the principal some levers to 
move in this direction and thus envisages an intermediate solution 
between two opposite and equally implausible models: the “solitary 
head” and “collegial co-determination.”
The reform thus marks a far-reaching turning point in the gover-
nance of Italian schools. Up to now, recruitment has relied entirely on 
criteria of a formal bureaucratic nature, and remuneration has been 
differentiated according to criteria based on teachers’ years of service 
and their engagement in “instrumental functions” (e.g., acting as the 
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school’s contact person for career guidance). One should note that the 
reform of the schools’ autonomy in 1997, in fact, had already notably 
strengthened the role of the principal. Moreover, this trend is hardly 
surprising because the larger degree of autonomy opens up a new 
decision-making space within the schools that the collegiate bodies 
cannot fill. Whoever has seen collegial interactions in educational insti-
tutions at work knows very well that those are not decision-making 
arrangements that could possibly handle the large number of delicate, 
complex, and timely decisions that the autonomous schools are called 
upon to make on a daily basis. These collegial bodies provide a forum 
for discussion on macro-level processes and spaces in which the princi-
pals can sound out and build support for new proposals. In the debate 
on the super-principal, however, the trade unions and the left of the PD 
saw the stronger position of the principal as a concession to entrepre-
neurial (manager-principal) or authoritarian (sheriff-principal) models 
that were even characterized as detrimental to the freedom of teaching. 
The teachers’ unions, which in Italy have played a central role in the 
governance of the schools for decades, obviously intended to defend 
the prerogatives of their members. Yet above all, the strengthening of 
the principals should be seen as a foreseeable or even necessary conse-
quence of the decisions made concerning the autonomy of the schools 
and the assessment of their performance. Let us see why.
The Governance of the Schools:  
The Assessment of Principals and Teachers
In other Western countries, reforms that have provided for a larger 
degree of autonomy have been accompanied by a parallel strengthen-
ing of assessment and accountability mechanisms (Sestito 2014). The 
idea is that the larger degree of freedom conceded to the schools will 
allow for an improvement of their quality only when accompanied 
by mechanisms to verify how the schools use this autonomy (assess-
ment), thus encouraging them to account for their own performance 
by means of systems of rewards and punishments (accountability). 
It is not clear that autonomy is always a good thing: some contex-
tual conditions may, in fact, engender outcomes very different from 
those that are expected (ibid.). Moreover, there are different logics of 
accountability, each of which may fit more or less well with the charac-
teristics of specific educational systems. These include (1) the creation 
of mechanisms to incentivize the individual teachers or schools to 
improve their performance; (2) the creation of forms of quasi-markets 
(e.g., vouchers for families allowing them to choose the school that 
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their children attend) by means of information on the quality of the 
schools made available by the central level; and (3) the privatization 
of the education system.
In Italy, the third solution has never enjoyed much support. The 
reform does grant private school reductions in social security contri-
butions, but it would be too far-fetched to argue that this foreshadows 
a privatization of the educational system, as some trade union repre-
sentatives have claimed. In fact, apart from the preschool segment, 
the numerical weight of private schools is marginal, and nothing 
would lead one to suspect that this situation will change significantly 
in the future. The second solution has also enjoyed only limited sup-
port in Italy, although the reform introduces a significant change that 
has gone unnoticed but might have a considerable impact. The reform 
provides for the creation of a web portal of the MIUR on which the 
schools will post their three-year plans of educational activities and 
their budgets, but also their self-assessment reports containing figures 
on the performance of the schools as measured by the Sistema Nazi-
onale di Valutazione (SNV, National Evaluation System). This new 
feature explicitly aims to “allow for a comparative assessment by the 
pupils and their families” (Art. 2). In other words, it seeks to create a 
competitive dynamic between the schools. However, such competition 
entails quite a few unknowns, not least because the families are not 
well equipped to correctly interpret the indicators of (alleged) quality 
posted on a website by the public authorities. As the data on the per-
formance of the schools are not based on value-added measures, the 
risk is that the families seeking to obtain information on the quality 
of the schools may end up deciding where to send their children not 
on the basis of the actual quality of the schools but on the basis of 
their socio-demographic composition. Publishing this information fur-
thermore risks a growing discontent with the INVALSI tests (already 
substantial in May 2015) and their possible boycott or the temptation 
to fabricate results. Renzi’s government has pushed far ahead on the 
publication of the data of the SNV without adequately taking into 
account the associated risks, thus demonstrating little awareness of 
potential repercussions.
It is nevertheless clear that by means of the SNV, Italy has resolved 
to rely primarily on the first mechanism of accountability, that is, put-
ting the schools in the position of assessing their own performance, 
but also using those assessments to lend support to schools in dif-
ficulty. In particular, as of the academic year 2014–2015, Italy has 
instituted an SNV that provides for a comprehensive assessment of the 
performance of each school on the basis of 49 statistical indicators. 
Although this detailed diagnostic tool has been put in place, some 
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important aspects of the performance of the schools are still neglected. 
Each school is called upon to compare itself to the national or provin-
cial figure in order to understand how it is positioned relative to the 
other schools in the same area and with a similar social composition. 
The statistical indicators should thus provide an objective and compa-
rable starting point for a discussion on which educational outcomes 
the school should improve urgently and what levers may be used to 
that end. This diagnosis is developed in the school’s self-assessment 
report and constitutes the starting point for an improvement plan that 
should list how it intends to enhance its educational activities.
Establishing the SNV was the work of the Monti government, but, 
due to some delays, it was implemented only with the 2015–2016 aca-
demic year, that is, under the Renzi government. Whatever one may 
think of the SNV, it constitutes without doubt a significant change for 
the Italian school system, and the Good School reform can be under-
stood only within the framework of the simultaneous reform of the SNV. 
Indeed, it should be kept in mind that if a school achieves disappointing 
results in the SNV and does not manage to improve in the subsequent 
years, no cuts in funding are foreseen, nor will its teachers be subject to 
sanctions or wage cuts. Instead, the principals will be rewarded or pun-
ished on the basis of their success or failure in achieving the objectives 
listed in the improvement plans. Simplifying somewhat, one can say 
that the SNV “unloads” the dynamics of accountability onto the school 
principals. In line with this basic decision, the Good School reform 
considers the principal to hold prime responsibility “for the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the management of the human, financial, techno-
logical, and material resources, as well as for the educational outcomes 
achieved” (Art. 16). More concretely, the reform increases the national 
fund for the remuneration of principals by 35 million euros annually 
as of 2016. This will allow for a considerable increase in the share of 
results-based remuneration of the principals.
The decision to strengthen the prerogatives of the principals can 
thus be understood within the logic of the SNV: the principals will 
be held responsible if their schools do not succeed in improving their 
performance. Such a solution would clearly have been incompatible 
with a context in which the principals were not able to select their 
own teachers or did not possess effective levers to involve them in 
improving the quality of the services offered. This inconsistency has 
now been mitigated, even though the staff that principals direct still 
largely depends on allocative mechanisms beyond their control. The 
combination of the Good School reform and the SNV thus outlines 
a new governance logic for the schools. On the basis of the self-
assessment report, the principals must formulate a limited set of clear 
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objectives that they intend to pursue in order to improve the perfor-
mance of the school, for example, by reducing the dropout rate. Based 
on this plan, the principal outlines the profiles of the teachers to be 
hired and selects them directly. For instance, from among the teach-
ers listed in the rankings, the principal may give preference to those 
with previous experience in tackling dropout rates. The principal then 
establishes an autonomy team dedicated primarily to improving the 
school’s performance and may also set up a group of teachers (the 
middle management of the school) who assist in the implementation 
of the improvement plan. Finally, the principal is now equipped with 
more financial incentives to reward those teachers who contribute to 
the activities of the school.
One may or may not agree with this model of governance, but it is 
important in any case to understand its internal logic. Unfortunately, 
the public debate on the Good School reform did not reflect on the 
close links between the growing autonomy of the schools, the imple-
mentation of the SNV, and the strengthening of the position of the 
principal, or on the obstacles that such a model will encounter during 
its application. If it had done so, the rhetorical bones of contention 
could have been reduced in favor of focusing the discussion on the 
problems of implementation, while simultaneously paying more atten-
tion to experiences from abroad that have exposed the difficulties and 
risks inherent in reforms such as this one. In fact, the risk is that the 
governance model outlined here remains a reform on paper only.
In particular, four major concerns with this model of governance 
will need to be addressed during the implementation phase. First, the 
SNV assumes that the schools are equipped with the necessary com-
petences to analyze and interpret the statistical indicators it provides. 
However, experimental tests indicate that the ability of the schools to 
translate those figures into a diagnosis aimed at improving the school’s 
performance is frequently weak. The schools also find it difficult to 
proceed from the self-diagnosis of a problem to the identification of 
possible solutions, mainly because Italy lacks repositories of good 
practices. Second, the Italian public administration has a very weak 
tradition of meritocratic assessment, and one might question whether 
the regional education authorities who are called upon to assess the 
principals would be able and willing to step outside of this tradition. 
Third, since the principals will be assessed on the basis of objectives 
that they themselves will formulate, they obviously will be tempted 
to set themselves objectives that will be easier to reach, or objectives 
measured by more malleable indicators. Yet these might not be the 
most relevant objectives. In theory, the improvement plan should be 
tightly linked to the self-assessment reports, but they will be examined 
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by external referees only in a small number of cases. Specifying the 
objectives thus risks becoming a self-referential exercise. Finally, this 
model of governance assumes that the principals, whose responsibili-
ties are being enhanced, possess competences in planning, organiza-
tion, and the management of human resources, which the majority 
of them in reality do not have (FGA 2013). It should be recalled that 
the principals have never been hired or trained with respect to such 
competences; they commonly are former teachers with expertise in 
bureaucratic management. In short, the governance model that is tak-
ing shape does exhibit internal coherence but operates with a rather 
unrealistic view of the key actors (teachers, principals, and regional 
education authorities) who are called upon to implement it. The criti-
cisms raised by the trade unions and the left of the PD have neglected 
these aspects, focusing instead on issues that have an immediate 
impact on the teachers (the super-principal, the privatization of the 
schools). In this public debate, Renzi, in his turn, has emphasized the 
major investment in the schools and the special plan for hiring teach-
ers—two issues that are assured to please the teachers.
The Recruitment of Teachers
Renzi’s promotional video depicted the Good School reform as the 
ultimate solution to the problem of precarious jobs in the Italian 
schools (“we say enough to precarious jobs and to substituting”), 
as it envisaged 100,000 immediate appointments to be followed by 
annual competitive examinations for tenured positions.7 In particular, 
the reform has opted to eliminate the long-standing prevalence of 
precarious jobs in Italian schools, that is, the so-called graduatorie 
ad esaurimento (GAE, full-list rankings),8 a cumbersome inheritance 
that, in effect, was no longer tenable. The recruitment of teachers has 
for a long time taken place through waves of mass hiring and ad hoc 
measures, a practice that has given rise to inconsistencies between the 
actual situation and the formal requirements for obtaining teaching 
positions. Such a path involves many years of precarious employment, 
in addition to uncertainties connected to multiple channels of access, 
changing rules, and frequent legal appeals to employment decisions.
In addition to the problems mentioned above, there was a need to 
ensure more didactic continuity and a fair remuneration to those who 
had been teaching on temporary contracts for many years. Moreover, 
the body of Italian teachers is among the oldest in the world (OECD 
2015), and its rejuvenation would seem desirable. In the coming years, 
large numbers of Italian teachers will reach retirement age, and a more 
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substantial recruitment drive would thus have been necessary in any 
case. Finally, the European Court of Justice handed down a verdict in 
November 2014 condemning Italy for the excessive use of temporary 
employment in schools. With the Good School reform, Renzi’s gov-
ernment has seized a contingent and financially burdensome oppor-
tunity to introduce a broader reform of the school system. A problem 
that could no longer be postponed was used to induce change while 
presenting the last-minute rescue in a positive light as a measure to 
rejuvenate the Italian teaching body and to overcome the problem of 
precarious employment. However, it is doubtful whether this will in 
fact occur as the teachers listed on the GAE are of above-average age 
(Bombardi and Checchi 2015). The fact remains that the Good School 
reform has provided a policy opportunity that the prime minister was 
the first to exploit in order to forcefully project the image of a govern-
ment investing in education.
From the start, three other aspects of the decision to eliminate 
the GAE gave more reason for concern (FGA 2014). The first was the 
existence of a spatial and skills mismatch between those who were 
in the GAE rankings and the actual need for teachers. For example, 
mathematics teachers are in great demand, but there were only few 
of them in these rankings, while music teachers, for whom there is 
little demand, were abundantly present. Second, a substantial share 
of those listed on the GAE did not have an SISS teaching qualification9 
or a degree in pedagogy and had not taught for some years, or never 
even did so. Finally, there was a need to address the unfair treatment 
of the many qualified candidates listed on the rankings of the indi-
vidual schools—an alternative channel for obtaining a teaching posi-
tion—instead of on the GAE. Those rankings contain candidates who 
on average are younger than those listed on the GAE and more closely 
match the needs of the schools. The mass hiring from the GAE has 
thus given precedence to a formal as opposed to a substantial criterion. 
Fenced in between a verdict of the Court of Justice and the pressure 
of the trade unions, there were obvious constraints on the choices that 
the government could make. If it had introduced distinctions between 
those listed on the GAE, it could have run the risk of additional legal 
appeals, while discontinuing the GAE had a high public relations value 
since it could be presented as “the end of precarious jobs.” 
Nevertheless, after the decision to hire all those on the GAE, many 
believed that the best candidates might not have been hired, maybe 
not even the candidates whom the schools needed (and still need). 
Moreover, it is likely that the next few years will see a staff turnover 
even more pronounced than the already high level currently experi-
enced. In fact, precisely because of the spatial and skills mismatch, 
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appointment from the GAE implies for many of the newly hired teach-
ers the need to relocate and/or to accept employment on the auton-
omy teams. Estimates from July 2015 indicate that almost half of those 
newly hired had been assigned to these horizontal tasks (Bombardi 
and Checchi 2015). The great risk is that those teachers will effec-
tively be employed on strengthening the schools’ autonomy and will 
not enjoy all the opportunities that the system offers them to change 
school in the shortest possible time. Moreover, the problem of precari-
ous working conditions is far from being solved. In fact, because of 
the skills mismatch, some teachers continue to be employed on unsta-
ble contracts; this is especially the case in the sciences, where the GAE 
had little to offer. However, it should be noted that the reform has also 
provided for a national competitive examination,10 thus establishing a 
regular rhythm in the recruitment process.
The reform provides for a further important change in matters of 
recruitment: the principal may directly and explicitly—also by means 
of job interviews—select the tenured teachers assigned to the school 
district. This is a very significant change for Italian schools. Such 
positions have a duration of three years, and it is up to the principal 
to decide whether or not to renew them. The selection of the teach-
ers, however, is not left solely to the discretion of the principal, as 
four criteria must be met. First, the teachers to be appointed must 
be listed on the rankings or have won a competitive examination; 
thus, they have been pre-selected according to universalistic criteria. 
Second, the principal must specify the profiles of the candidates, 
which must conform to the needs indicated in the three-year plan of 
educational activities. Third, the principal is expected to publish the 
positions filled, the selection criteria used, and the curricula vitae of 
the candidates on the site of the school. Fourth, the principal must 
formally declare the absence of any conflicts of interest deriving from 
marriage, family relationships, or affinity with the newly hired teach-
ers. Still, the possibility that a principal may manage to favor family 
members or acquaintances cannot be discounted. Moreover, the prin-
cipal might choose candidates with an affinity toward his or her own 
values or political views.
A final new feature in the recruitment of teachers is the creation of 
a new channel of access to teaching positions in secondary schools, 
which over time, is destined to become the only channel. In future, the 
candidate-teachers will attend university-level master degree courses 
corresponding to the subjects listed in the examinations. After hav-
ing passed a national competitive examination, those selected will be 
hired by a school on a three-year internship contract. In the first year, 
the teachers should obtain a postgraduate teaching certificate, also 
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issued by the universities, while in the two following years the interns 
will work in the schools. At the end of this three-year period, they 
will be appointed on an open-ended contract. Although it remains 
to be seen what exact rules will apply to this process, it nevertheless 
appears a rather convincing solution because it draws on the best 
previous experiences: a short and concentrated university education 
on the skills needed in the classroom is combined with a long period 
of on-the-job training. At the same time, and in contrast to the current 
situation, the candidate-teachers are given certainty concerning the 
duration of their temporary employment.
Lastly, the reform has introduced the requirement of lifelong learning 
for teachers while giving those with open-ended contracts a bonus of 
500 euros annually to be spent on educational activities. This additional 
investment in human capital sends a signal concerning the importance 
of the continuous upgrading of the teachers’ skills, even though this 
indiscriminate distribution of funds may not be very effective and actu-
ally looks more like an attempt to enlist support for the reforms.
In sum, one of the signature themes of the reform, that is, the 
abolition of precarious jobs in the school system, in reality appears to 
be a political move (partly bold and partly inevitable) whose priority 
is not the improvement of the quality of the teaching. The problem 
of the GAE was courageously tackled after years of inertia, but some 
critical issues—the effective staff needs of the schools, the adequate 
qualification of the teachers, and their continuous presence in the 
same school—have become secondary concerns. At the same time, the 
Good School reform envisages future access channels to teaching posi-
tions that constitute a change with more bright sides than shadows.
Strengthening the Humanistic Curriculum,  
the Liberal Arts, and Job Training
One key theme of the Good School reform was the strengthening of 
humanistic education. The reform insisted on the need to upgrade 
the teaching of art history and music (and of physical education in 
primary schools). Simultaneously, more weight was to be given to 
the teaching of English at all educational levels. Moreover, at several 
points the text insists on the importance of digital skills. These new 
features would appear to be more an instance of symbolic politics 
than an effective change, as schools are urged to give more weight to 
these subject matters but without changing the teaching schedules to 
make space for them. Rather, the aim is to change the opinion that the 
teachers and managers have of those subjects.
150 Gianluca Argentin and Carlo Barone
A similar conclusion holds for the job skills of the pupils. It is 
well known that the ability of Italian schools to prepare students for 
the labor market is very weak. The Good School reform intends to 
improve the employability of pupils with three measures. First, the 
courses that provide for an alternation between school and work will 
be strengthened at the high school level. Such courses combine intern-
ships in companies with school activities that emphasize job skills 
(e.g., classes on tasks to be performed in private companies). Such 
courses have been offered for 10 years, but only as optional activities, 
and up to now they have been of rather limited duration: on aver-
age 95 hours for each student (INDIRE 2015). The time spent in the 
companies thus amounts to little more than a short visit. The reform 
transforms these courses into mandatory activities for all pupils in the 
final three years of high school, with an overall duration of at least 400 
hours spread over three years for the technical and vocational high 
schools and of at least 200 hours for the high schools that prepare 
students for a university education. Moreover, 100 million euros have 
been set aside to support these courses. 
Three shortcomings of this measure should be mentioned. The first 
is the decision to extend these courses to the high schools that prepare 
their pupils for a university education. The goal was to avoid a juxta-
position between these schools and schools oriented toward the labor 
market (technical and vocational high schools), but it remains to be 
seen if this will actually help to bridge a divide that exists in practice. In 
high schools preparing students for a university degree, the uptake of 
such courses has been very limited: only 2 percent of the pupils attend-
ing these courses come from such schools (INDIRE 2015). Neverthe-
less, the reform obliges these schools to offer them (contradicting the 
emphasis on the autonomy of the schools, one might add), albeit with 
fewer hours and allowing for the possibility of internships with profes-
sional associations and cultural institutions such as museums. The 
second shortcoming concerns regional disparities. Figures from INDIRE 
(2015) indicate that courses combined with internships are used least 
where there is the most need for them, that is, in the southern regions, 
which lack a fabric of productive activities that would be able to sup-
port such educational activities in an effective and non-opportunistic 
way. The more general question is whether those in the Italian private 
sector are sufficiently mature to conceive of these courses as an invest-
ment in the quality of their future labor force, or whether they will give 
in to facile opportunism. In any case, the Good School reform requires 
that the pupils be given the opportunity to express their opinion on the 
courses taken. Moreover, a bill of the rights and duties of the pupils has 
been issued, and hopefully it will contain the risk that the internship 
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degenerates into unskilled labor. The third shortcoming derives from 
the limited propensity of the schools to offer such courses and to make 
space for them in the curriculum. It is likely that these courses, rather 
than promoting entry into the labor market, end up having an informa-
tive function or become mere formalities.
The second measure to improve the employability of pupils is 
intended to stimulate networks of schools, private companies, and 
public bodies to create “local laboratories for employability” that will 
offer training activities in strategic sectors of Italian-made products. 
The goal is to further open up the schools to links with the surrounding 
area and to allow for the use of the school premises outside of school 
hours. Despite generous funding (45 million euros in the academic 
year 2015–2016), there is a risk that these initiatives will remain too 
sporadic, fragmented, and small-scale to produce significant results.
The third measure is intended to strengthen the higher colleges of 
technology (istituti tecnici superiori). In collaboration with private com-
panies and local authorities, these technical or vocational institutes will 
offer two- or three-year postgraduate courses with a strong vocational 
orientation in some of the sectors where there is a high demand for 
qualified technicians. In such courses, students will spend a substan-
tial number of hours in companies, which will be actively involved in 
the overall design of the educational activities. Up to now, the number 
of students involved has been limited, but the preliminary figures on 
their employment opportunities are rather encouraging (INDIRE 2015). 
The Good School reform acknowledges these positive outcomes and 
stimulates their growth with an additional, if somewhat small, 1 mil-
lion euros. Accordingly, this educational segment is destined to remain 
of modest dimensions, even though the Italian industry is in great need 
of a tertiary vocational segment.
Clearly, the underlying goal of these measures is to strengthen the 
ability of the Italian education system in order to effectively promote 
employability. However, it was decided not to make decisive changes 
in the set-up of the curriculum or the teaching schedules, thus limit-
ing the reforms to marginal segments and activities that have a weak 
impact. These measures therefore seem destined to remain little more 
than a declaration of intent.
Conclusions
Overall, the Good School reform sends four clear messages: (1) the 
need to empower principals and teachers within a meritocratic frame-
work; (2) the desire to put an end to the long history of precarious 
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employment in the education system and to establish a new way 
of recruiting; (3) the call for schools to open themselves up to the 
external world and create stronger links with the labor market; and 
(4) the necessity of investing additional resources in education (after 
many years of opposite developments). The reform has been com-
municated in a very effective manner, bordering on disingenuousness. 
Nevertheless, it is legitimate to harbor doubts concerning its effective 
implementation. The changes in the governance of the schools are 
based on assumptions concerning the skills and objectives of prin-
cipals, teachers, and regional education authorities that are not very 
realistic. In terms of the quality of the teachers hired and of their 
effective correspondence to the needs of the schools, the reform of 
the recruitment process is rather debatable. The curricular and extra-
curricular changes are destined to have a limited impact. In addition, 
a non-trivial shortcoming for a reform launched by a center-left coali-
tion deserves to be underlined: topics such as combating inequality 
and equal opportunities for disadvantaged students are almost entirely 
absent. It is interesting to note how little the opponents of the reform 
have dwelled on these conspicuous contradictions.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that Renzi and his government have 
shown courage in tackling an old and unresolved problem and in tak-
ing clear positions that contrast with the protection of the corporate 
interests of the teachers, an approach that is traditionally prioritized 
by the trade unions and the Democratic Party. In short, less has been 
done than was announced, but more than one might have expected 
from a coalition government led by a party that has produced very few 
innovations in education policies in the recent past.
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Notes
 1. See Law No. 107 of 13 July 2015 in the Gazzetta Ufficiale, no. 162, http://
www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2015/07/15/15G00122/sg.
 2. “Scuola, la riforma di Renzi: 3 miliardi per assumere 148mila docenti 
entro il 2015,” 3 September 2014, http://www.ilmessaggero.it/ (accessed 
30 December 2015).
 3. “La buona scuola: Le linee guida della riforma,” https://labuonascuola.
gov.it (accessed 30 December 2015).




 5. These are standardized linguistic and mathematical tests taken each year 
by Italian pupils. 
 6. “Sciopero scuola 5 maggio 2015 contro la riforma. Renzi: ‘Ascoltiamo la 
protesta,’” 7 May 2015, http://www.ansa.it/ (accessed 30 December 2015).
 7. “Scuola, Renzi: ‘Riforma non del premier o ministro, ma di tutti,’” 3 Sep-
tember 2014, http://www.repubblica.it/ (accessed 30 December 2015).
 8. All the candidates on the GAE were eventually to be offered a position, as 
compared to only the top-ranked one(s) in the case of regular rankings.
 9. The SISS (scuole di specializzazione all’insegnamento secondario) are 
university courses dedicated to training the new teachers of the second-
ary schools.
 10. The call for the national examination was to be published by 1 December 
2015, but it has been postponed to the beginning of 2016. 
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